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U.S. AIRLINES AND ANTITRUST:  THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEFENSIBLE POLICY TOWARDS A UNIQUE INDUSTRY
DANIEL J. GIFFORD*
ROBERT T. KUDRLE**
The Justice Department has recently approved a series of mergers in the
airline industry that look very questionable in light of its own merger guidelines.
This Article attempts to explain the Justice Department's decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines announced their agreement to merge
in April 2008.  The Justice Department approved the merger later that year.  On1 2
May 3, 2010, barely two years after the Delta/Northwest announcement, United
Airlines and Continental Airlines announced their intention to merge.  The Justice3
Department approved the merger and it was consummated later that same year.4
Southwest Airlines and AirTran announced merger plans in 2011 and
consummated that merger in 2015.  In February 2013, American Airlines and US5
Air announced their intention to merge.  The Justice Department initially brought6
suit to block the merger,  but later (on November 12, 2013) reached a settlement7
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** Orville & Jane Professor of International Trade & Investment Policy, Humphrey School
of Public Affairs and the Law School, University of Minnesota.
1. Lisa Stark et al., Delta and Northwest Announce Merger, ABC NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016, 3:40
PM),  h t tp : / /abcnews.go.com/WN/BusinessTravel /del ta-nor thwest -announce-
merger/story?id=4650633 [https://perma.cc/P7VU-SG8X].
2. Martin Moylan, Justice Department Approves Northwest-Delta Merger, MPR NEWS
(Nov. 8, 2016, 3:45 PM), http://www.mprnews.org/story/2008/10/29/northwest_delta_merger_
approved [https://perma.cc/8YGR-R2JS].
3. United and Continental Announce Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016, 3:53 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/united-and-continental-announce-merger/?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/FFA3-QSA2].
4. Gregory Karp, American, US Airways Complete Merger: United Airlines Loses Title as
World's Largest Airline, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:20 PM), http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2013-12-09/business/chi-american-airlines-merger-20131209_1_us-airways-ceo-ceo-doug-
parker-united-airlines [https://perma.cc/5KMS-8Q3G].
5. Terry Maxon, Now Departing: AirTran Airways Flies Off into the Sunset After Southwest
Merger, DALL. NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/2014/
12/27/now-departing-airtran-airways-flies-off-into-the-sunset-after-southwest-merger
[https://perma.cc/XS8K-JG77].
6. Linda Wertheimer & Wade Goodwyn, American, US Airways Announce Merger, NPR
(Nov. 8, 2016, 5:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/02/14/171975386/merger-deal-expected-for-
american-u-s-airways [https://perma.cc/86X4-6WET].
7. See Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F.
Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-01236) [hereinafter CIS].
http://doi.org/10.18060/4806.1146
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with the parties and approved the merger.  Under the settlement, the airlines8
agreed to divert gates and slots (take-off and landing rights) at seven major
airports.  After these mergers, the United States domestic market contains four9
large airlines, each holding a share between fourteen and twenty percent of the
domestic air travel market.  (Because AirTran only held about a 3.5% market10
share, the Southwest/AirTran merger does not raise market-concentration issues
similar to those of the other three mergers).
The airline industry shows a four-firm national concentration level based on
airline passenger miles of about seventy percent while four-firm concentration
based on the shares of all domestic ticketed passengers is close to eighty
percent.  Although the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for airlines passenger11
miles of 1489.3 indicates an un-concentrated market, there is general agreement
that national concentration levels, however calculated, are of secondary
importance.  City-pair market concentration far better reflects the market power12
of the carriers, and this is the focus of official attention.  Mergers have13
eliminated competition between the merger participants, and many city-pair
markets have much higher concentration ratios and HHI levels than the industry
as a whole.  The government’s complaint in the American/US Air merger, for14
example, lists 460 city-pair markets that the guidelines would treat as
presumptively unlawful as the result of that merger because their HHI would
8. Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, Justice Dept. Clears Merger of 2 Airlines, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 1:04 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/u-s-said-to-be-near-
settling-american-us-airways-merger-lawsuit/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/M82D-Z7D8].
9. See Complaint at Appendix A, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-
01236).
10. The most recent government data (November 2015 - October 2016) lists the market
shares of these carriers as American 19.3%, Southwest 18.3%, Delta 16.9%, United 14.5%. Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/
WHR6-LNUK] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). The market shares are based on passenger revenue
miles. Id. Later references will be to BTS TranStats. The categories of unconcentrated, moderately
concentrated, etc. are from the U.S. Department of Justice and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
See infra notes 226-29.
11. Fiona Scott Morton et al., Benefits of Preserving Consumers Ability to Compare Airline
Fares, TRAVEL TECH. ASS’N 1, 35-37 (2015), http://www.traveltech.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/05/CRA.TravelTech.Study_.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB5K-MTUC].
12. See id. The index is a measure of industry concentration used in the merger guidelines
of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Id. at 35. The index is calculated
by squaring the percentage market share of each firm in the industry and adding them. Id.
Therefore, the maximum possible value of a monopoly is 10,000 (100 ). Id. at 36. Because the HHI2
is constructed from the squares of market shares, it yields a higher number as shares are larger on
average and also as the shares are more unequal.
13. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-515, AIRLINE COMPETITION: THE AVERAGE
NUMBER OF COMPETITORS IN MARKETS SERVING THE MAJORITY OF PASSENGERS HAS CHANGED
LITTLE IN RECENT YEARS, BUT STAKEHOLDERS VOICE CONCERNS ABOUT COMPETITION 9 (2015).
14. Morton et al., supra note 11, at 36.
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exceed 2500 and the merger would raise the index by over 200 points.15
Discussing the overall situation in 2014, one study concluded: “[N]early 90
percent of all passengers traveled on city-pairs with HHIs above 2,500, and about
40 percent of city pairs have HHIs in excess of 4,000.”  Why has the DOJ16
acquiesced to this increased concentration?
This Article examines the evolution of government policy that has culminated
in the approval of the recent airline mergers and the apparent approach of the
Justice Department in evaluating them.  What rationales for the mergers did the17
DOJ accept and what do they tell us about merger evaluation in the Department?18
That discussion is preceded by a brief sketch of the industry,  the relevant19
markets used for antitrust in the industry,  the nature of industry cost,20 21
determinants of consumer demand,  competitive behavior in the industry,  the22 23
importance of politically-controlled complementary inputs,  and general antitrust24
activity in the industry.25
I. THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: HISTORY AND CHARACTERISTICS
A. From Regulation to Deregulation
After four decades of regulation during which airline fares and routes were
subject to the control of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Congress opted to
deregulate the airline industry in 1979.  Prior to deregulation, the industry was26
composed of eleven trunk carriers and twelve local service carriers.  Subsequent27
to deregulation many new carriers entered the market.  As of the mid-1980s, the28
15. See Complaint at Appendix A, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d
69 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
16. Morton et al. supra note 11, at 36. For example, an HHI of 2500 in a city-pair market
could mean that it is being served by four equal-sized airlines, and a market with an HHI of above
4000 could mean that it is being served by three airlines of somewhat unequal size.
17. See infra Part I. 
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B-C.
21. See infra Part I.D.
22. See infra Part I.E-F.
23. See infra Part I.G. 
24. See infra Part I.H.
25. See infra Part I.I.
26. See William A. Jordan, Airline Entry Following U.S. Deregulation: The Definitive List
of Startup Passenger Airlines, 1979-2003, at 1, TRANSP. RES. F. (Mar. 6, 2005), http://www.
trforum.org/forum/downloads/2005_Deregulation_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVF5-9HGZ]; see
also Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
27. See Jordan, supra note 26, at 2-3. 
28. John M. Kost, Effects of Airline Deregulation, MACKINAC CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016, 6:52 PM),
https://www.mackinac.org/6358 [https://perma.cc/4EHR-76MV].
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air carriers servicing the U.S. domestic market included Northwest, TWA,
American, United, Continental, Braniff, Delta, US Air, Texas Air, People
Express, Southwest, Piedmont, Ozark, and Republic.  In 1986, Northwest29
merged with Republic and TWA acquired Ozark.  In 1987, People Express was30
merged into Continental.  Other mergers followed.  Indeed, most of the entrants31 32
were gone by 1990.33
Since deregulation, descriptions of the industry’s structure have typically
distinguished the so-called “legacy” carriers, those carriers that were operating
before deregulation, from “low cost” carriers (LCCs) that began operating in the
post-regulation period.  Although the term LCC is very widely used, it carries34
two different connotations. One is that the latecomers have not been burdened
with high labor costs generated or facilitated by regulation, which continued into
the post-regulation period.  The post-regulation entrants paid wages much closer35
to prevailing labor market conditions and made them low- (or lower-) cost
operations compared with their older rivals.  The other connotation is that the36
newcomers offer a rather Spartan product and can charge lower prices on that
count alone.  The two characteristics have typically gone together, but they37
should be distinguished.
A popular image long held the largest carriers were the legacies and that the
low-cost carriers tended to be relatively small.  This is no longer a true38
29. See generally Jordan, supra note 26.
30. Carol Jouzaitis, Republic, Northwest to Merge, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:06 PM),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1986-01-25/business/8601070312_1_republic-airlines-american-
airlines-third-largest-airline [https://perma.cc/6Q9F-P3GW]; Reginald Stuart, T.W.A.-Ozark Merger
Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:15 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/13/business/
company-news-twa-ozark-merger-is-approved.html [https://perma.cc/HJZ5-RNQH].
31. Robert E. Dallos, People Express Fades into History as Merger Is OKd, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 9, 2016, 7:18 PM), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-12-30/business/fi-1132_1_fares [https://
perma.cc/9ZG6-V4UQ].
32. See U.S. Airline Mergers and Acquisitions, AIRLINES FOR AM., http://airlines.org/data/u-s-
airline-mergers-and-acquisitions/ [https://perma.cc/7FL7-6BUT] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). 
33. Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets Work . . . Or Do They?, in
ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 63, 87 (Nancy L. Rose ed.,
2014) (noting forty-seven new airlines had entered the market by 1984, but only seven still existed
by 1990).
34. Southwest is generally referred to as an LLC, although it began operating prior to
deregulation as an intrastate carrier where it was exempt from CAB control. See id. at 80.
35. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Competition, and Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the
Airline Industry, 67 AIR L. & COM. 685, 703 (2002).
36. Id.
37. Id. (linking low fares to no-frills services).
38. See generally Tatiana Morales, Flying on Smaller and Low-Cost Airlines, CBS NEWS
(July 23, 2002, 4:00 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/flying-on-smaller-and-low-cost-airlines/
[https://perma.cc/TQ67-2TNF] (splitting airlines into major airlines versus small and low-cost
airlines as categories for comparison).
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description of the industry. Prior to the merger of Delta and Northwest,
Southwest, an LCC, was the largest airline in the U.S. market.  Currently, the39
U.S. domestic airline industry is composed of the four large U.S. carriers all of
which have recently merged and several LCCs, the largest of which is JetBlue
with a market share of 5.5%.  The remaining carriers also include Alaska, Spirit,40
SkyWest, Frontier, Hawaiian, Virgin America and Allegiant Air.  These carriers41
compete with Southwest and the three legacy carriers on many routes.
B. Financial Performance and Bankruptcies
Along with the prevalence of mergers, the industry has been distinguished by
its dismal financial performance since the onset of deregulation.  In 2011,42
Severin Borenstein, perhaps the closest student of the airline industry, wrote a
widely cited article in the American Economic Review calling attention to the
chronic losses incurred by the industry stating, “The industry lost $10 billion
from 1979 to 1989, made $5 billion in the 1990s and lost $54 billion from 2000
to 2009 (all figures in 2009 dollars).”  Borenstein titled his article “Why Can’t43
US Airlines Make Money?” challenging scholars and others to explain these
repeated losses.  As he observed, “There is no conventional long-run equilibrium44
explanation for an industry that perpetually loses money.”  In a 2008 article, Paul45
Stephen Dempsey summarized the industry financial experience, stating that by
the end of 1991, the industry had lost all the profit that it had previously earned
plus another $2 billion.  It would recover in the late 1990s, and then lose it again46
in the early twenty-first century, suffering losses in every year but one from 2001
through 2009.  But both Dempsey and Borenstein wrote before the recent47
resurgence of airline profitability following the Great Recession.
39. December 2010 Airline System Traffic Up 2.9 Percent from December 2009, U.S. DEP’T
OF TRANSP. (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/default/files/rita_archives/bts_press_
releases/2011/bts014_11/pdf/bts014_11.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHH6-PLBT].
40. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, supra note 10.
41. U.S. Certificated Air Carriers, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (May 29, 2015), https://www.
transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Certificated%20Air%20Carrier%20List_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3X4-H5YC].
42. Severin Borenstein, Why Can’t US Airlines Make Money? 101 AM. ECON. REV. 233, 233
(2011) (describing the financial record of the airline industry post-regulation as dismal).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 236 (calling for more research by industrial organization economists).
45. Id. at 233.
46. Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Financial Performance of the Airline Industry Post-
Deregulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 421, 427 (2008).
47. Id. at 424-25 (showing the airline industry lost money in 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1990,
1991, 1992, 1993, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006); Borenstein, supra note 42, at 234
(indicating airline losses in 2008 and 2009).
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C. Long-Term Price Decline; Long-Term Growth; Volatile Environment
Average passenger fares have been falling over the past two decades.
Measured in 2015 dollars, the average fare was $454 in 1995; in 2015 it was
$377, or seventeen percent less.  From 2002 to 2015, output, as measured in48
available seat miles, has increased from 670,252,981 to 742,617,500.  In 201549
total enplanements (passengers carried) reached 696,016,894 (domestic)
exceeding the industry’s 2007 pre-recession high of 679,185,450.50
As shown by the large number of unprofitable years noted, the airline
industry operates in a highly volatile environment. Borenstein and Rose have
argued that uncertainty about the right business model has typically led each
carrier to engage in considerable expansion in good times only to suffer
subsequent losses in downturns.  Demand is growing secularly, but it drops51
significantly during periods of recession or when a threat of terrorism arises, and
unpredictable fuel cost changes and labor unrest add to uncertainly.  Thus the52
periods in which the industry incurred losses include the recessionary periods at
the beginning of the 1980s, the similar period at the beginning of the 1990s, the
period after the dot-com bubble, the period following the 9-11 terrorist attacks
and the period of the so-called ‘Great Recession.’53
D. Industry Cost Structure
1. Large Fixed Costs.—The airline industry’s fixed costs are large in relation
to its variable costs.  Moreover, industry practice is to set the airline’s schedule54
three months in advance; this makes all costs (including even labor and fuel)
fixed for that three-month period.  According to a number of industry critics, the55
heavy fixed-cost component combined with competition pushes price towards
marginal cost, and large fixed costs ensure that average cost exceeds marginal
48. Annual U.S. Domestic Average Itinerary Fare in Current and Constant Dollars, U.S.
DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/airfares/programs/economics_and_finance/air_
travel_price_index/html/AnnualFares.html [https://perma.cc/A8ZU-5QDR] (last visited Jan. 18,
2017).
49. Available Seat-Miles (the Number of Seats and the Distance Flown in Thousands) All
Carriers—All Airports, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.
aspx?Data=4 [https://perma.cc/8TV2-S3RX] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
50. See Bureau of Transportation Statistics: Passengers: All Carriers—All Airports, DEP’T
OF TRANSP., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1 [https://perma.cc/HPT7-
H4TE] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
51. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 49.
52. Dempsey, supra note 46, at 430-31 (noting the losses following the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
the recession of 1990-1994, the recession and fuel spike of 1981-1983, and depressed demand after
the terrorist attack on Pan Am 103).
53. BIJAN VASIGH, KEN FLEMING & THOMAS TACKER, INTRODUCTION TO AIR TRANSPORT
ECONOMICS: FROM THEORY TO APPLICATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2013).
54. See, e.g., id. 
55. Id. at 265.
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cost.   56
There are two major approaches linking large fixed costs to industry
profitability. Under the first approach, the adverse impact of fixed costs on
profitability results from industry overcapacity.  This is inconvenient for the57
airlines, but is self-correcting over the long run: Over time, the airlines will
reduce their capacity, bringing it in line with the scope of their operations and
restoring their profitability.  Indeed, that is the way competitive markets adjust58
capacity to demand.
The second approach assumes the airline industry to be one of a few
industries that are structurally prone to so-called “destructive competition,”  an59
affliction in which affected industries are said to operate for prolonged periods
at a loss.  Economic theories about destructive competition usually identify the60
affected industries as characterized by high-fixed costs and easy entry.  In fact,61
the avoidance of destructive competition was the rationale under which regulation
was initially imposed on the trucking industry in 1935 and on the airline industry
in 1938.  Current versions of the destructive competition approach make use of62
“core” theory: In a market of many sellers, high fixed costs, low marginal costs,
and perishable (or non-storable) product, efficiency sometimes depends on
cooperation among the players.63
Most economists currently reject the concept of destructive competition as a
policy reason for according special treatment to an industry, unless a prolonged
56. See, e.g., Dempsey, supra note 46, at 460-61.
57. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategies for Survival, 23 TRANSP.
L.J. *15, *25 (1995) (explaining empty seats caused by overcapacity drive down overall seat price
because airlines want to cover some of their fixed cost).
58. See VASIGH, supra note 53.
59. Dempsey, supra note 57, at 85-89.
60. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS
172-76 (1971) (discussing “destructive competition”).
61. RABAH AMIR, Market Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance, 1, 26 (Nov.
2010), https://economics.indiana.edu/home/about-us/events/conferences-and-workshops/files/2011-
03-04-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF5D-SBGC] (associating large fixed costs and easy entry with
destructive competition).
62. See S. REP. NO. 75-1661, at 2 (1938) (urging immediate enactment of regulatory
legislation over the airline industry in order “to prevent the spread of bad practices and of
destructive and wasteful tactics resulting from the intense competition now existing within the air-
carrier industry”); S. REP. NO. 74-482,at 2 (1935) (reporting motor carrier competition having been 
“carried to an extreme which tends to undermine the financial stability of the carriers and
jeopardizes the maintenance of transportation facilities and service appropriate to the needs of
commerce and required in the public interest”).
63. See generally John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 556
(1987) (providing a background on core theory and the necessity of cooperation); for a more
concise and recent treatment, see DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (4th ed. 2005), https://wps.aw.com/aw_carltonper_modernio_4/
[https://perma.cc/9DG8-JLWQ].
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period of unprofitability would jeopardize services that are essential to public
welfare, such as (in the case of the airlines) neglecting safety precautions.  This,64
however, is a moot point because there is no evidence that the airlines are
behaving in this manner. In fact, the large fixed-cost component in airline costs
resembles many other industries. Many traditional industries, such as the steel and
automobile industries, are characterized by high fixed costs.  Even newer65
industries whose capital consists of intellectual property, such as the
pharmaceutical and software industries are also characterized by high fixed
costs.  These industries all rely on the market to adjust capacity to demand.66
Borenstein has suggested an explanation for poor industry performance that
involves fixed costs, but one that takes account of interaction with other
characteristics of the industry.  He argues that since regulation, there has been67
a great lack of certainty about viable business plans—a situation that has led to
an emphasis on route expansion and overinvestment when times are good.  This,68
combined with the instability of both demand and fuel cost, explains much of the
varying but dismal profit performance of the industry.  It is not necessary to69
criticize management’s investment decisions to explain the industry’s losses when
the explanation is a temporary shrinkage of demand. The industry’s investment
in aircraft gives it the potential of earning enormous profits, as demonstrated in
the current post-recessionary period.  Management’s investment decisions will70
be proven prescient or inadvisable by their long-term market effects.
2. Other Aspects of Industry Cost Structure.—Air travel has generated a rich
literature on the determinants of costs. This has been made possible by copious
data collection and reporting practices, much of it required by federal regulation,
and has made U.S. airlines perhaps the most empirically studied industry in
history. One major determinant of cost is the price of fuel, which has historically
varied over time between eleven and thirty percent of total airline costs.  71
64. See, e.g., George J. Benston, Savings Banking and the Public Interest, 4 J. MONEY,
CREDIT, & BANKING 133, 201-04 (1972) (arguing increased competition would not lead to
destructive competition in the banking industry and increased competition with deregulation is,
generally, in the public interest).
65. Henry Kallstrom, Investing in the Automotive Industry—What You Need to Know, MKT.
REALIST (Feb. 5, 2015), http://marketrealist.com/2015/02/raw-materials-biggest-cost-driver-auto-
industry/ [https://perma.cc/LZ2Z-DZXL]. 
66. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Perspectives on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 20 HEALTH AFF. 136,
144 (2001) (“Research-based pharmaceutical firms have high fixed costs (costs unrelated to the
annual volume of production) and low variable costs (those that vary roughly proportionately with
the volume of production).”).
67. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 33.
68. Id. at 34.  
69. See Jad Mouawad, Airlines Reap Record Profits, and Passengers Get Peanuts, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/business/energy-environment/airlines-
reap-record-profits-and-passengers-get-peanuts.html [https://perma.cc/AWZ9-ER2U].
70. Id. 
71. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 95.
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Another major determinant, holding all others factors constant, is called the “load
factor,” i.e., what percentage of a plane’s total seats are filled.  A number of72
route restructuring and data-intensive pricing practices have moved the average
load factor from as low as fifty percent before deregulation to eighty-three
percent by 2011.  Given that about eighty percent of a flight’s costs are usually73
fixed, this was a major cost-saving development.  Another important but74
intuitive finding is that longer flights are cheaper per passenger mile than shorter
ones.75
Many industries exhibit important economies of scale; however, that concept
applied to airlines must be approached with care. An influential study by Caves
et al. distinguishes between economies of scale and economies of density.76
Economies of density result when, holding destinations constant, there are more
flights, larger aircraft, or a denser seating arrangement—with the overall route
structure and the load factor held constant.  For example, (given a constant load77
factor) a denser seating arrangement or larger aircraft reduce cost per available
seat mile. In those cases, more passengers are served by a less than proportionate
outlay for pilots and crew, and by the same airport facilities.  A critical78
difference between economies of density and economies of scale is that network
structure is held constant when measuring economies of density.  Economies of79
scale, by contrast, include possible additional declines in cost resulting from
additional destinations.  Incremental economies of scale, however, affect average80
cost at a declining rate as the saving is allocated per seat mile; but economies of
density achieved through denser seating affect each flight at the same rate on
similar aircraft.  Such definitions, while perhaps somewhat arbitrary, suggest the81
complexity of considering cost determinants in the industry. Much evidence
suggests considerable economies from output based on density—about fifteen
percent from a doubling of output—but little if any on an output expansion based
72. Airline Economics, AVJOBS, http://www.avjobs.com/history/airline-economics.asp
[https://perma.cc/8ZLR-QCYJ] (describing the necessity of selling a fixed number of passenger
seats) (last visited Jan. 19, 2017). 
73. Load Factor (Passenger-Miles as a Proportion of Available Seat-Miles in Percent (%))
All Carriers - All Airports, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?
Data=5 [https://perma.cc/QR9U-B2EJ] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).  
74. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 95.
75. Id. at 14. 
76. Douglas W. Caves et al., Economies of Density Versus Economies of Scale: Why Trunk
and Local Service Airline Costs Differ, 15 RAND J. ECON. 471, 474 (1984).
77. Id. 
78. VASIGH, supra note 53, at 125-26 (noting that as a given airline expands, the number of
passengers carried from a specific airport and the average cost of that transport declines, because
the costs of airport facilities are spread over more passengers; inversely, as the number of such
passengers declines, the airline’s average cost per passenger increases).  
79. Caves et al., supra note 76.
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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on the number of destinations without an increase in density.  Moreover, unit82
costs have historically varied greatly among legacy carriers and not just between
the legacies and the LCCs.83
The pattern of flights and plane changes has also been a source of cost saving.
Borenstein cites the development of the hub-and-spoke system as one of the great,
unanticipated developments of the post-regulation airline world.  All of the84
legacy and many of the LCC carriers have found that considerable savings can
be achieved by routing passengers through selected airports and combining them
for flight continuation.  The development of small regional jet aircraft85
accelerated this practice. The hub-and-spoke network is a major example of
economies of density, achieved through consolidating operations.86
E. Network Demand Effects
Network effects is another industry characteristic that has been emphasized
in recent discussions of public policy towards mergers in the industry, and its
significance will be explored later in this Article.  The airline industry and other87
transportation industries—like the telephone and other communications industries
and also the software industry—generate network effects. In airlines, as in many
other networks, there are “demand side economies of scale [that] arise whenever,
as a network grows, it provides more than a proportional increase in its value to
consumers.”  As noted, the hub-and-spoke structure of the legacy carriers88
generates network effects and is the source of significant efficiencies.89
F. Overall Demand
Although the demand for air travel has risen greatly over time as rising
incomes have confronted stable or falling real prices—U.S. travel measured by
revenue passenger miles quadrupled between 1978 and the turn of the twenty-first
century, but demand has also varied with the business cycle, and from other
shocks, already noted.90
The industry has always understood that business travelers have far more
inelastic demand than does the rest of the travelling public (“leisure”) travelers.91
The industry has exploited these differences in demand by the practice of offering
higher-priced (e.g. business class) seating and lower-priced seating; and by
82. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 106-07.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 19.
85. Id.  
86. Id. at 41.  
87. Id. at 5.  
88. JOHN E. KWOKA, JR. & LAWRENCE WHITE, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 520 (6th ed.
2014).
89. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 19.
90. Id. at 35. 
91. Id. at 15. 
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varying the ticket prices with the day of the week and the time of day; and also
varying them as the time before takeoff approaches.  Indeed, the airlines exploit92
differing demands, much as utilities impose different charges to business
customers than to residential customers.93
We have noted the hub-and-spoke structure’s effect on reducing cost through
economies of density.  Now we consider the impact of the hub-and-spoke94
structure on demand. From its earliest development the hub-and-spoke system has
created both costs and benefits for those based near hub airports.  From a95
passenger’s perspective, the greater choice of times and destinations (enhancing
consumer welfare) has had to be set against the price premium that traditionally
has attached to hub dominance (lowering consumer welfare),  although that96
premium has declined substantially over recent years as result of LCC
competition bolstered by computerized price shopping. Passengers, however,
continue to show a marked preference for the airline offering the most service
from an airport, holding all other characteristics of a flight constant.  Besides the97
attractiveness of the service, this is also due to the successful use of marketing
techniques, especially frequent flyer programs offering free tickets or other
amenities, that introduce non-linear pricing  into a purchaser’s calculation and98
can create a principal-agent conflict for business travelers who may put personal
benefit ahead of company savings.  Loyalty discounts also exist for corporate99
purchasers based not on the volume of purchasing, but rather on the percentage
of the firm’s total air travel budget that is devoted to a certain airline.  Cutting100
against the incumbency advantages of airport amenities and frequent flyer
programs has been the growing role of computer-assisted price comparison and
92. Id. at 15-16.  
93. See generally Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J.
47 (1927) (explaining the theory of exploiting demand to cover capital and other fixed charges).
Exploiting demand is widely used by public utility regulators. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T.
Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern Economies: Time for
Reconciliation?, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1248 (2010).
94. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 41.
95. Id. at 19-20.
96. One commentator describes the hub (and associated spoke) as follows: “At hubs, we find
a lot more nonstop service and relatively higher fares[.] . . . At spokes, we find very vigorous
competition to carry passengers through competing hubs.” Michael E. Levine, Antitrust Lessons
from the Airline Industry: Airline Deregulation: A Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 693 (1991).
97. See Severin Borenstein, Trends: Pray for JetBlue, MILKEN INST. REV. 5, 11 (2014)
(stating flyers prefer the airline that offers the most service out of passengers' home airport
locations regardless of schedule, price, or onboard features). 
98. In linear pricing, a purchaser pays a total amount for a purchase that is determined by
price times quantity; any other pricing is nonlinear. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, Competitive
Nonlinear Pricing and Bundling, 77 REV. ECON. STUD. 30, 30 (2010). Thus, a seller that is offering
a quantity discount is engaged in nonlinear pricing. 
99. Levine, supra note 96, at 690-91.
100. Borenstein, supra note 97, at 8. 
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purchasing.  A recent survey suggests that nearly ninety percent of all travelers101
either sometimes or always use computer-assisted price comparisons before
booking.  In short, the airline industry shows a full range of demand effects,102
pricing behavior, and customer responses that would be expected in imperfectly
competitive markets.
G. How Do Airlines Compete?
At the time of deregulation, many economists tended to view competition in
the airline industry through the lens of William Baumol’s theory of contestable
markets.  Under this theory, an industry behaves competitively if entry and exit103
into the market are costless.  The airline industry was seen as a contestable-104
market paradigm.  It was relatively costless to move an aircraft from one105
location to another.  Therefore, when any airline was able to raise its profits106
beyond a competitive return, those profits would attract entry that would compete
them away. Because entry and exit were effectively costless, market power and
sustained supracompetitive returns were impossible in the airline industry.107
In fact, entry and exit are not costless; new airline entrants must incur a set
of pre-operating and “ramp-up” costs that are sunk (that is, nonrecoverable) in the
event that the entrant leaves the market.  The inapplicability of contestability108
theory is reflected in econometric studies that have shown that prices are higher
101. Fiona Scott Morton et al., Benefits of Preserving Consumers’ Ability to Compare Airline
Fares, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS. 6 (May 19, 2015), http://www.traveltech.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/05/CRA.TravelTech.Study_.pdf [https://perma.cc/7B32-QB28] (discussing that travelers
would like to explore pricing and other options they have, although loyalty programs somewhat
influence their decision); see also id. at 31-32 (discussing how an increase in the availability of
metasearch engines increases competition among airlines).
102. See id. at 8.
103. See Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 403-04 (1987) (discussing role of contestable
market theory during airline deregulation and recognizing theorists who applied contestability to
the airline industry in the early 1980s); see also William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An
Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
104. Baumol, supra note 103, at 3.
105. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The Contestability of Airline Markets
During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 125 (1981) (applying
contestable market theory to city-pair airline markets); see also Levine, supra note 103
(recognizing theorists who applied contestability to the airline industry in the early 1980s).
106. See Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of
Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 128 (1984) (noting moving aircraft was easy). 
107. See Bailey & Panzar, supra note 105, at 125, 129 (noting airline prices were regulated
by the possibility of competitors entering the market in 1979-1980 because the market was “almost
perfectly contestable” and discussing how easy entry and exit into markets by new entities keep
pricing competitive).
108. Levine, supra note 96, at 60.
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when the number of competitors is lower and that the impact of potential
competition alone, at least from legacy carriers, is modest.  But one element of109
price competition has come through strongly in virtually all empirical work: the
role of Southwest Airlines, which has had a moderating effect on prices after
entry into a market has been announced or appears imminent, but before actual
entry.  Another emerging factor is the effect of JetBlue’s market entry, in which110
entry of that carrier into city-pair markets has had a dramatic effect on prices.111
In sharp contrast to the “Southwest effect,”  the impact of actual, not112
potential, competition from the legacy carriers may be modest. Brueckner and his
colleagues,  in a widely cited study, found that the reduction of legacy carriers113
on a route from three to two in 2008 led to virtually no price increase, while the
same reduction led to an increase of four percent in 2000. Similarly, a
consolidation from two to one carriers led to a price rise of twelve percent in
2000 but only 3.9% in 2008.  Borenstein has interpreted the finding as114
suggesting that duopolies or even three-firm markets may already be engaged in
full monopoly pricing.  In light of the greatly increased level of concentration115
by mergers since 2010,  a reasonable inference is that price competition among116
the legacy airlines may now be very weak at best. Variations in fares certainly
exist, but they are driven by complicated pricing models that combine a number
of seats with various restrictions that form price “buckets” that change
109. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 121. 
110. See JAN K. BRUECKNER ET AL., NEW POLICY ISSUE: NETWORK VS. LCC COMPETITION
AND AIRFARES: NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. 3 (2010), http://www.iata.
org/publications/economic-briefings/Brueckner_Competition_Fares.pdf [perma.cc/TLS5-CT98]
(showing the presence and potential entry of Southwest into a given market significantly lower
fares in that market); see also Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, How Do Incumbents Respond
to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines 2, 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11072, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11072.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7CW-
YBAD] (noting other airlines lower prices when Southwest announces opening a route but before
it actually begins the route).
111. See Complaint at ¶ 800, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69
(D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-01236) (reciting the Boston-Washington D.C. fares dropped by $700
when JetBlue entered that market).
112. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 124 (pointing out the significance of the “Southwest
effect” and Southwest’s influence on airline markets).
113. BRUECKNER ET AL., supra note 110, at 4.
114. Id. Ten years earlier, a Department of Justice study had found a ten percent average price
effect in moving from three to two equally-sized participants in city-pair markets and discovered
that a further move from two to one resulted in a twenty percent price increase. See Robert D.
Willig, Antitrust Lessons from the Airline Industry: The DOJ Experience, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 695,
701 (1991).
115. See Borenstein, supra note 97, at 10 (pointing out monopoly-level pricing is used when
two legacy carriers are on the same route).
116. Id. at 5 (discussing mergers after 2010 and stating the market share for the top four
airlines increased from fifty-five percent as late as 2009 to seventy-one percent in 2014).
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substantially over time before a flight and increase the value of computer based
fare comparisons.117
This does not mean that the legacy airlines do not compete, but like many
other oligopolies, they appear to do so largely in dimensions other than price.118
In addition to frequent flyer programs and terminal amenities, legacy carriers
have made onboard enhancements, such as offering in-flight entertainment
systems on more domestic flights.  (At the same time, of course, space per119
person,  free food and drink offerings, and some free bag carriage in many120
legacy carriers have been shrinking. )121
As noted previously, Borenstein concluded that constant experimentation
with business models was one of the prime causes of industry profit instability
and negative overall profit levels. This implies that the airlines have been
uncertain about the strategies of their rivals, and this uncertainty would impede
the tacit cooperation that would facilitate oligopoly pricing. Borenstein also
concludes that overinvestment in good times in the quest for route expansion has
played an important role in industry losses.  The unprecedentedly high level of122
concentration recently achieved may have permanently dampened expansionary
moves while facilitating pricing based on the recognition of mutual
dependence.  This tacit cooperation among the major airlines may remove the123
instability that has plagued the industry. Many industry observers have expressed
117. See Morton et al., supra note 101, at 19.
118. See Teresa Cederholm, The Airline Industry's Growth and Impact on Economic
Prosperity, MKT. REALIST (Dec. 29, 2014), http://marketrealist.com/2014/12/bargaining-power-
airline-industrys-customers-suppliers/ [http://perma.cc/9RDS-4HL9] (noting legacy carriers focus
on providing extra features for flyers, while LCCs offer lower prices without such features); see
also Felix Salmon, When Airlines Don’t Compete, REUTERS: U.S. EDITION (Nov. 18, 2013),
ht tp: / /blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/11/18/when-air l ines-don’t-compete/
[https://perma.cc/H3HC-TFQ5] (stating legacy carriers do not engage in price competition). 
119. Grant Martin, Domestic In-Flight Entertainment Is Now Free on American, Delta and
United, SKIFT (Aug. 15, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://skift.com/2016/08/15/domestic-in-flight-
entertainment-is-now-free-on-american-delta-and-united/ [https://perma.cc/8BNQ-2BYR].
120. See Charlie Leocha, How to Avoid Airline Seat “Densification” (You’ll LUV This),
ELLIOTT (Oct. 18, 2015), http://elliott.org/blog/how-to-avoid-airline-seat-densification-youll-luv-
this/ [https://perma.cc/W7MH-V84N] (noting the trend of legacy carriers to reduce available seat
space).
121. See C.S., Legacy vs. Low-Cost Carriers: Spot the Difference, ECONOMIST: GULLIVER
BUS. TRAVEL (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2013/03/legacy-vs-low-
cost-carriers [https://perma.cc/772C-445R] (noting legacy carriers have engaged in cost-cutting
strategies like adding baggage fees and cutting down on food offerings on short flights).
122. Borenstein, supra note 97, at 6-7.
123. See Borenstein, supra note 42, at 235 (noting excessive expansion of some airlines can
lead to lower pricing overall for airlines); see also Aaron Karp, Maintaining Capacity Discipline,
AIR TRANSPORT WORLD: AIRKARP (Jan. 28, 2015), http://atwonline.com/blog/maintaining-
capacity-discipline [https://perma.cc/JK5K-KLA7] (discussing current use of “capacity discipline”
among major U.S. airlines).
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alarm at the failure of prices to decline with fuel in 2014 and 2015 and at the
declarations by legacy CEOs of a need for capacity restraint.124
H. Market Imperfections Connected with Airport Facilities: The Generation of
Scarcity and Economic Rents
Of the many features that distinguish airlines from other industries, publicly-
owned facilities and politically-influenced decision making by an array of local
and federal agencies stand out. U.S. airports are overwhelmingly controlled by
public bodies,  the air traffic control system lies entirely with the Federal125
Aviation Administration, and the highly obtrusive security system is operated by
the Department of Homeland Security.  Although airfares were deregulated and126
the rate-setting CAB was abolished, the Department of Transportation, as the
successor to the CAB,  retains a residual regulatory role over the aviation127
124. Karp, supra note 4. According to news sources, the government is investigating a possible
agreement among the carriers to limit capacity. Pete Williams & Tom Costello, DOJ Looking into
Possible Airline Collusion to Keep Fares High, NBC NEWS (July 2, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.
com/news/us-news/doj-looking-possible-airline-collusion-keep-fares-high-n385336
[https://perma.cc/Q4NQ-8JTJ]. There are, of course, major problems in any attempt to identify a
capacity limitation agreement. Statements by airline officials warning against undue capacity
expansion are indistinguishable from expressions of opinion. See Peter Coy & David McLaughlin,
What Does It Take to Prove Airline Collusion?, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (July 16, 2015, 7:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-16/what-does-it-take-to-prove-airline-collusion-
[https://perma.cc/DY5D-YGQQ] (noting intentional communication is required to show an
agreement existed). It is also the deployment of capacity on specific routes that creates problems
for the airlines flying those routes, not aggregate capacity expansion, as the deployment can occur
whether or not aggregate capacity is expanded. But marketing experimentation will continue. Delta,
for example, is now trying to find a balance between the long-run yield of auctioning off business
class upgrades and providing the upgrades to flyers with high accumulated mileage. See Justin
Bachman, Airlines Really Don’t Want to Upgrade People for Free, BLOOMBERG: PURSUITS (Mar.
4, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-04/airlines-really-don-t-want-to-
upgrade-people-for-free [https://perma.cc/9WB9-8W69] (noting Delta plans to charge more for seat
upgrades rather than giving upgrades for free); see also Airlines Auction Seat Upgrades,
MONEYTIPS (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.moneytips.com/airlines-auctioning-upgrades [https://
perma.cc/U77B-MXJ9] (noting Delta has run test auctions on seat upgrades).  
125. Under the Airport Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. §§ 47101-47134 (2012),
generally only publicly-owned airports are eligible for funding under the Airport Improvement
Program. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 47102 (18) and (26) (2012) (defining grants as money being given to
“sponsors” and defining “sponsors” as including public or public-use airports); see also National
Policy: Airport Improvement Program Handbook, FAA DOT, Order No. 5100.38D (2014)
https://www.faa.gov/airports/aip/aip_handbook/media/AIP-Handbook-Order-5100-38D.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7HF-D4Q6] (clarifying only public agencies and public-use airports are eligible
to be sponsors for Airport Improvement Program grants).
126. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 124.
127. See CAB Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703 (1984) (transferring
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system that extends to control over the economic fitness of airline entrants and
consumer protection activities.  Its role may also extend to competitive128
considerations (other than enforcement of the merger provision of section seven
of the Clayton Act) affecting the airlines.  The infrastructure of the air transport129
system is funded by a combination of local and federal monies, some of which
come from airport use charges and from bond issues.  Congressional legislation130
has often stipulated conditions for new federal support.  The bonds have131
sometimes been purchased by airlines,  which can then enable them to exercise132
influence (“majority-in-interest”) over airport expansion activity that could
facilitate entry.133
Although most airports are not congested most of the time,  certain key134
airports such as Chicago’s O’Hare; the three airports serving New York
(LaGuardia, Kennedy, and Newark);  Atlanta;  and Los Angeles experience135 136
substantial congestion.  The growth of air traffic is bound to increase congestion137
regulation authority from the CAB to the Department of Transportation).
128. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., RCED-89-93, AIRLINE COMPETITION: DOT’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF AIRLINE REGULATORY AUTHORITY (1989), http://www.gao.gov/products/
RCED-89-93 [https://perma.cc/XV7K-PPXW] (evaluating the consumer protection function of the
Department of Transportation); see also 49 U.S.C. § 41108 (2012) (granting Secretary of
Transportation authority to make decisions on applications for certificates required to operate
airline carriers).
129. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 41101 (2012) (setting forth requirement for airline carriers to obtain
certificates to operate); id. § 41712 (discussing “unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods
of competition”).
130. Airport Financing, AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT’L – N. AM., http://www.aci-
na.org/content/airport-financing [https://perma.cc/A5YS-NAQS] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
131. See FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL, FAA Order No. 5190.6B, at 15-1, 15-3 (Sept.
30, 2009), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/5190_6b.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9XYD-ZYRT] (listing several federal acts placing restrictions on airports that receive federal
funding).
132. See Airport Business Practices and their Impact on Airline Competition, DEP’T OF
TRANSP., at viii (Oct. 1999), http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/17000/17100/17129/PB2000108301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PBB-GRAH] (noting purchase of bonds can lead to more protection in airline
agreements).
133. See Morton et al., supra note 101, at 43 (discussing how some airline agreements contain
“majority-in-interest” provisions, which grant airlines more power in airport projects and
decisions).
134. Michael E. Levine, Airport Congestion: When Theory Meets Reality, 26 YALE J. ON REG.
37, 41-42 (2009). 
135. Id. at 53, 56.
136. Thanksgiving in the Skies: A Look at the Future of Air Travel in America, U.S. TRAVEL
ASS'N 1, 10 (2014), https://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/files/Media%20Root/Thx_report_
single_page.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF6R-MH2Z] (listing Atlanta as one of the airports that will
continue to have capacity problems even after the airport makes additions).
137. Editorial Bd., LAX Congestion Demands Regional Solutions, L.A. DAILY NEWS (July 29,
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over the long term. Although expansion and new construction are underway at
several major airports,  only one new major airport (in Denver) has been138
constructed in over two decades.139
The disposition of limited gate space and the use of airspace at certain times
(slots) have typically been handled by various administrative rules favoring
incumbency.  Gates are commonly leased to airlines under exclusive long-term140
leases.  Although the leasing airline sometimes subleases to other carriers for141
short-terms, this arrangement keeps ultimate control in the hands of the long-term
lessee. At airports where a single airline generates more than fifty percent of the
passenger volume, federal law requires submission of a plan to increase
competition in order for the airport to be eligible for federal financial aid for
expansion.  Although Congress intended this legislation to foster competition,142
it sometimes creates the opposite effect. Both gates and slots are often
successfully hoarded by incumbents to impede entry.  Moreover, general143
aviation (small private planes) are allowed to clog facilities through the use of
fees that do not reflect their negative externalities.  Additionally, flights from144
small cities have uneconomic access to major airports in response to political
pressure, and the air travel control system staffed by FAA employees has lagged
badly in technology compared to privatized systems in other countries.  The145
Department of Transportation relies on advice from the Department of Justice on
the competitive impact of slot transfers, but this sometimes only keeps a bad
2015, 6:30 PM), http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20150729/lax-congestion-demands-regional-
solutions [https://perma.cc/EX8U-YYHD].
138. Atlanta is adding twelve new gates, Los Angeles is adding eighteen gates, and Houston
is adding five gates. Jad Mouawad, Airports Focus on the Ground, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/business/building-boom-takes-hold-at-us-airports.html
[https://perma.cc/Y56Z-6QF5].
139. Id.
140. See generally The Antitrust Implications of Airport Lease Restrictions, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 548, 557-58 (1990) (describing majority-in-interest clauses make entry difficult because
entrants are forced to sublease gate space from incumbents at high prices). 
141. Id. at 551.
142. 49 U.S.C. § 47106(f) (2012); see also John Sabel, Airport Facilities Agreements: An
Overview, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 769, 786 (2004) (explaining the competition plan requirement).
143. See generally Gregory M. Seigel, Attention Passengers: Your Flight Will Be
Delayed—Congestion Pricing as a Solution to Airport Traffic Management, 39 TRANSP. L.J. 165,
177 (2012) (detailing how new airlines had trouble getting slots under the High Density Rule
because incumbents hoarded them).
144. See generally J. David Grizzle et al., Navigating the Turbulence of Competing Interests:
Principles and Practice of the Federal Aviation Administration, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 777, 784, 803
(2010) (noting the competition for space, which leads to the negative externality of delay). 
145. Scott McCartney, The Air-Traffic System U.S. Airlines Wish They Had, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
27, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-air-traffic-system-u-s-airlines-wish-they-had-
1461776053 [https://perma.cc/2KD3-DPHJ].
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situation from getting worse.  To the extent that these administrative146
arrangements impede entry or expansion, they generate economic rents,
advantaging the dominant airlines, and likely account for significant portions of
the so-called “hub price premium.”  Unsurprisingly, therefore, Ciliberto and147
Williams found that gate control at congested airports is a key element of the hub
price premium.148
I. Government Supervision of Mergers and Competition
From deregulation in 1978, supervision over airline mergers initially
remained in the CAB.  The end of the CAB came on January 1, 1985, with149
supervision over airline mergers passing to the DOT where it remained until the
end of 1988.  Congress divested the DOT’s antitrust authority over airline150
industry mergers and gave it to the DOJ in hopes of greater enforcement against
anticompetitive airline mergers.  The DOT, however, retained authority151
(formerly administered by the CAB) to halt “unfair or deceptive practice[s] or
unfair method[s] of competition. . . .”  This authority was contained in section152
411 of the Federal Aviation Act,  which was closely modeled after section five153
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). Section 411 of the Federal
Aviation Act has been renumbered and reenacted as 49 U.S.C. § 41712, but this
Article follows common usage in the airline industry by continuing to refer to the
provision as section 411. Just as the Federal Trade Commission asserts power to
146. See e.g., Ken Heyer & Carl Shapiro, The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust
Division, 2009-2010, 37 REV. INDUS. ORG. 291, 304-06 (2010). 
147. See generally Justin Bachman, Forget About Airline Mergers. Now It’s All About Trading
Airport Slots, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2015-06-16/forget-about-airline-mergers-now-it-s-all-about-trading-airport-slots
[https://perma.cc/255Q-JY3U] (noting airlines are swapping slots to boost profits at hubs).
148. Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Limited Access to Airport Facilities and
Market Power in the Airline Industry, 53 J. L. & ECON. 467, 485-86 (2010).
149. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235, 339-40
(2003).
150. Id.
151. Alberto G. Rossi, Grounding Future Consolidations: United-US Airways Cancel Flight,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 883, 886 (2002). The CAB Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-444, 98 Stat.
1704 vested the Department of Transportation (as the successor to the CAB) with supervision over
airline mergers until the end of 1988. At that time, merger supervision became the responsibility
of the Department of Justice. The merger approvals of the Department of Transportation have been
subject to criticism, for example Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Eernest F. Hollings (D-
S.C.) said: “Merger after merger has been approved (by the Transportation Department), including
those opposed on legitimate competitive reasons by the Justice Department[.]” Transportation
Official Defends Airline Merger, LA TIMES (Nov. 5, 1987), http://articles.latimes.com/1987-11-
05/business/fi-18968_1_airline-mergers [https://perma.cc/N3E9-QAPU]. 
152. 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (1994).
153. Id.
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prohibit anti-competitive behavior beyond the reach of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts under section five of the FTCA,  the DOT asserts power to prohibit such154
behavior beyond the reach of the Sherman and Clayton Acts under section 411.
It asserts that power despite Congress having explicitly transferred its
enforcement authority under section seven of the Clayton Act to the DOJ.
II. THREE PHASES OF ANTITRUST ACTIVITY
A. The Market Magic Phase
The theory of market contestability, already noted, provided part of the
impetus for the 1978 deregulation and much of the related intellectual atmosphere
for the next several years.  The optimism of the deregulators matched that of155
entrepreneurs. Entry was dramatic but often short-lived. Although there were
about a dozen each long distance and local jet carriers at the dawn of
deregulation, forty-seven entrants joined them by 1984.  Of those that entered,156
only seven were still operating in 1990.  Another cycle of entry arose in the157
mid-1990s when eighteen new carriers entered, but once again, most of the
entrants ultimately disappeared.  These recurring cycles of entry and exit are158
consistent with the volatility of the airline passenger market.
Contestability as an assurance of competitive behavior turns on three crucial
assumptions: New firms have the same technology, prices, costs, and information
as incumbents; there are zero sunk costs; and the lag between incumbent
knowledge of entry and entrant’s new supply is less than the lag of price response
by incumbent firms.  In the airline industry, some new carriers often had lower159
costs than the incumbents, which have traditionally been saddled with high labor
costs due largely to union entrenchment under regulation.  The other two160
154. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). In its recent case against Intel Corp., the FTC invoked both section
2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of the FTCA. Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch would have had
the Commission rely exclusively on section 5. See In re Intel, Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009)
(Rosch, concurring and dissenting). Section 5 is the Commission’s “stand alone” authority. See
John Graubert & Jesse Gurman, The FTC/Intel Settlement: One Step Forward, One Step Back?, 25
ANTITRUST *8, *9 (2011). It is unclear how far this “stand alone” authority extends. See, e.g., E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139-42 (2d Cir. 1984).
155. See Dempsey, supra note 35, at 713 (explaining how proponents of deregulation thought
contestability theory pertained to the airline industry).
156. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33 at 87.
157. Id. at 88.
158. Id. at 88.
159. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 172-73 (4th ed.
2005).
160. See generally Terry Maxon, American Airlines Says It Needs Labor Cuts to Survive;
Unions Disagree, DALL. NEWS (Apr. 2012), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/
2012/04/23/american-airlines-says-it-needs-labor-cuts-to-survive-unions-disagree
[https://perma.cc/QR7J-ESNR] (noting American Airlines has very high wages and seeks to reduce
558 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:539
conditions also raise doubts about the relevance of the approach: Sunk costs may
be low but they are not negligible, and incumbents will know of entry long
enough in advance to mount an immediate response upon entry. The most
successful entrant, Southwest, misses the contestability paradigm entirely. It
maintained a considerably lower cost of production than the legacy carriers until
recently.  It developed a reputation for a dependable and high quality, if161
somewhat Spartan product. Southwest also avoided head-on attacks against the
legacies, preferring an approach of attrition.  In doing the latter, it discouraged162
predatory price attacks. Southwest’s impact on markets, where it was thought
likely to enter, is consistent with “limit pricing,” a much older model of pricing
than contestability.
Throughout this whole period—before, during, and after the high tide of
belief in airline-market contestability—Alfred Kahn, the father of deregulation,
maintained a strong belief in vigorous antitrust enforcement.  Kahn did not view163
contestability as reducing the need for antitrust.  Rather, he believed the164
deregulated airline industry needed conventional antitrust remedies, especially in
regard to predatory pricing by incumbent firms  and increased concentration165
from uncontrolled mergers. In 1987, he wrote critically of the DOT’s laissez-faire
policies and its failure to use its antitrust authority to block anticompetitive airline
mergers: “[I]f contestability were perfect, there would be no need for antitrust
laws at all. . . . That is very close to the position the Department of Transportation
has in effect taken in blithely dismissing objections by the Department of Justice
to the Northwest-Republic and TWA-Ozark mergers. . . .”  Merger studies from166
1985-1988, when the DOT was the merger enforcement authority, support Kahn’s
view that the DOT was over-tolerant of airline merger activity.  Considering the167
labor costs). 
161. Justin Bachman, Southwest CEO’s Cost Crusade: Haggling with Unions While Profits
Soar, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2014, 5:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-
17/southwest-airlines-plan-to-keep-costs-low-saying-no-to-pay-raises [https://perma.cc/ETR3-
ULLS].
162. See generally Shawn Tully, Southwest Bets Big on Business Travelers, FORTUNE (Sept.
23, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/23/southwest-airlines-business-travel/ [https://
perma.cc/8CAC-MMXX] (explaining how Southwest flew to small markets to avoid legacies).
163. See generally Joseph B. White, Airline Mergers: What the Father of Deregulation Might
Say, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2013/02/
12/a-u-s-airline-industry-big-four-what-alfred-kahn-might-say/ [https://perma.cc/XS98-P2UN]
(explaining Kahn’s belief that antitrust regulators needed to stop airlines from gaining too much
control over well-traveled and important routes).
164. Id.
165. See Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1067 (1987)
(citing A. Kahn, Towards a Policy for Dealing with Competitive Responses 1-4 (Oct. 19, 1978)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the California Law Review)). 
166. Id. at 1062.
167. See generally E. Han Kim & Vijay Singal, Mergers and Market Power: Evidence from
the Airline Industry, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 549, 550 (1993) (detailing how the government did not
2017] U.S. AIRLINES AND ANTITRUST 559
fourteen mergers over the period in question, one such study found price
increases by the merging firms on affected routes of 9.44% relative to unaffected
routes.  Other firms on these routes saw an increase of over twelve percent.168 169
This result was consistent with increasing concentration leading to a higher level
of recognized mutual dependence. On the issue of predatory behavior, the DOT
eventually moved in Kahn’s direction, proposing its own policies to counter
predatory or predatory-like behavior of major carriers.170
B. The Vigorous Antitrust Phase
There were few mergers approved over the following twenty years, and those
that were usually “involved at least one airline that was in extreme financial
distress.”  The DOJ opposed the proposed acquisition of US Airways by United,171
announced in 1999, and it was withdrawn because: (1) both carriers had hubs in
the Washington D.C. area, which would monopolize service to some cities; (2)
they dominated several hub-hub markets; (3) they were two of the three main
airlines serving small Northeast cities, and the merger would significantly
increase concentration in eastern cities; and (4) competition would be reduced on
several transatlantic markets.  The DOJ later contrasted its negative judgment172
on this transaction with its approval of America West/US Air merger.  The latter173
was described as a geographic “barbell,” (i.e., largely non-overlapping networks)
that was held up as “an example of the kinds of mergers that may easily avoid
antitrust problems.”174
What of Fred Kahn’s other concern: predatory behavior? The basic rules of
that analysis are set out in the Supreme Court’s 1993 Brooke Group decision.175
The Brooke Group predation standard requires sales below an appropriate
contest mergers, which led to increased airfare), http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/ehkim/articles/
mergersmarkets-aer1993.pdf [https://perma.cc/6245-SFZJ].
168. Id. at 550.
169. Id.
170. Department of Transportation Proposal, Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in Air
Transportation Industry, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 50, 163 (1998).
171. Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 20.
172. J. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust for
Airlines (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-airlines [https://perma.cc/
YNU8-5L44].
173. Id.
174. Id. Beginning in the 1988s, the airlines began a generally uncontroversial practice of
codesharing, which increased the ease with which a passenger could move across a route involving
more than one airline. The passenger need get only one ticket to travel with two carriers. This
involved an agreement between carriers that assigned with sale of the entire ticket by one airline
at a price that it determined, while the other carrier was reimbursed at estimated operating cost. The
practice appeared to eliminate the usual inefficient double marginalization of vertical arm’s length
sales without the need for integration.
175. Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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measure of cost and a likelihood of recoupment.  Along with the Brooke176
Group’s formulation, the lower courts generally apply the standards worked out
in the 1970s by Donald Turner and Philip Areeda (the Areeda-Turner standard),
which is consistent with the Brooke Group standard but is somewhat more
precise, recommending the use of average variable cost as the effective boundary
between predatory and non-predatory pricing.   177
In 1999, the DOJ filed suit against American Airlines for predatory behavior
towards LCCs, Vanguard, Western Pacific, and Sunjet on three routes connecting
Dallas-Fort Worth with Wichita, Colorado Springs, and Long Beach.  The178
problems of applying previous standards to airline competition became
immediately apparent.  The court attempted, as far as possible, to follow the179
scheme established in Brooke Group: establishing that (1) the incumbent would
have market power without the additional competition provided by the LCCs, (2)
American engaged in pricing below some appropriate measure of its costs, and
(3) there was a “dangerous probability” of subsequent recoupment of losses
incurred during the predatory period.  American Airlines lowered its prices to180
match those of the LCCs, claiming that these price reductions were simply
meeting the competition.  Although the DOJ argued that American’s increased181
capacity on the contested routes greatly diluted demand for the newcomers’
similarly priced product—a Section 2 violation, independent of predatory
pricing—the courts did not accept the argument.  There were complicated and182
inconclusive attempts by both sides to establish whether or not American actually
did price below the usually accepted average variable cost standard.  Although183
the district and circuit courts left the appropriate standard unresolved because the
DOJ’s cost estimates were rejected,  the circuit court did recognize that the184
appropriate cost figures should be based only on additional capacity brought to
the route as part of the alleged predation.  Finally, the circuit court did not reject185
the DOJ’s contention that predatory pricing in one venue need not result in
recoupment there alone but instead could plausibly have broader profitable
impact pour encourager les autres.186
176. Id. at 225-27.
177. Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 716-18 (1975).
178. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1111 n.1, 1112 (10th Cir. 2003).
179. Id. at 1114-15.
180. Id. at 1114-17.
181. Id. at 1112.
182. Id. at 1111, 1120-21.
183. Id. at 1116-20.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1119.
186. Id. at 1115; see also Gregory J. Werden, The American Airlines Decision: Not with a
Bang but a Whimper, 18 ANTITRUST 32 (2003) (discussing the “pragmatic” approach taken by the
Tenth Circuit, accepting the government’s argument in favor of analyzing costs and revenue of
incremental capacity additions rather than the system-wide analysis required by Brooke Group; the
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In 2000, Spirit Airlines sued Northwest Airlines for violating Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.  Once again, the pattern involved lowering prices toward those187
of the entrant while greatly increasing capacity, effectively thinning demand for
the entrant’s offering.  This was followed by a sharp increase in prices after the188
LCC’s withdrawal.  Spirit constructed a case that did not involve recoupment189
beyond the Detroit airport.  Instead, it argued that delays in new entry alone190
would have made Northwest’s price and capacity changes profitable.  Although191
Spirit’s case was rejected by the district court’s summary judgment, the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case for full trial.  That same year, 2005, Northwest filed192
for bankruptcy and Spirit dropped the case.193
Continuing complaints by would-be successful entrants into the industry as
well as consumer groups about predation towards start-ups generated attention by
the DOT, which issued a proposed approach to predation tailored especially to the
airline industry based on a legal framework different from the one developed by
the courts.  The DOT proposal simply ignored prevailing precedent (most194
notably Brooke Group), bypassing consideration of the price/cost relation
entirely.  Instead the test would simply be whether a capacity expansion costs195
the dominant firm (1) more revenue than the entrant would have diverted from
it or (2) more than the result of either matching the entrant’s fares or establishing
the same relative fares as with better established entrants elsewhere.  Although196
the DOT’s proposal was based on its authority under section 411 to prevent unfair
or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition, it did not fare well.197
Congress responded to the Department’s proposal by mandating a study by the
National Council’s Transportation Research Board (TRB) which failed to endorse
the DOT’s policy.  A GAO report describing the DOT’s proposal noted that198
several airlines had criticized the proposal’s language as vague, and that the DOT
court also decided the issue rather than remand it, “[a] trial was unlikely to elicit much evidence
not already in the extensive summary judgment record” and would only “delay the inevitable”).
187. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2004).
188. Id. at 921-24.
189. Id. at 924.
190. Id. at 924-25, 928-30.
191. Id. at 928-30.
192. Id. at 921, 953.
193. Id. at 921 n.1; see also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills., Predatory Pricing in the
Airline Industry: Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines, in 6 THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 307 (John
E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 2014).
194. Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation
Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17, 919 (proposed Apr. 10, 1998).
195. Off. of the Secretary, U.S. DOT, Docket OST-98-3713, Enforcement Policy Regarding
Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry: Findings and Conclusions on the
Economic, Policy, and Legal Issues 70-72 (2001).
196. Id. at 16-17.
197. Id. at 9-12.
198. Id. at 2-4, 8.
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was planning on refining its terminology in response.  Finally, in January 2001,199
the DOT decided to address predatory behavior in fact-specific adjudications
under section 411.200
In the comments on the DOT proposal, the major airlines argued that it was
proper for them to match an entrant’s low fares on a large number of seats,  a201
proposition rejected by the DOT. The major airline position also describes the
behavior of American in the suit brought by the DOJ, where American matched
the fares of Vanguard, Western Pacific, and Sunjet on routes out of Dallas-Fort
Worth and added seating capacity.  The major airlines’ position thus appears to202
be based upon the Supreme Court’s Brooke Group opinion, read as condemning
predatory pricing defined as below-cost pricing combined with a likelihood of
recoupment and as accepting the lawfulness of pricing and related behaviors that
do not fall within that definition.  The airlines’ reading of Brooke Group may203
also be supported by the Court’s assertion in that case that evaluating pricing
above a relevant measure of cost may be “beyond the practical ability of a judicial
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting.”  In American Airlines, the government failed to show that American’s204
incremental revenues on the flights in question fell below either its average
variable cost or its average avoidable cost.  The government—DOT and the205
DOJ—had been searching for an alternative to a strict reading of Brooke
Group.  It has found limited support among scholars but not in the courts or206
elsewhere.207
Overall, the government was left in a quandary in the early years of this
century. The DOT was unable to implement its new approach to predation, and
the DOJ was unable to persuade the court that capacity additions could be treated
as predatory behavior, or establish below-cost pricing under the classic Brooke
199. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/RCED-99-225, AVIATION COMPETITION:
INFORMATION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S PROPOSED POLICY, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2, 14 (1999).
200. Off. of the Secretary, supra note 195, at 98-113 (discussing full legal justification
provided by DOT).
201. Id. at 45-52 (describing comments of network airlines and DOT’s assessments of those
responses).
202. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2003).
203. Off. of the Secretary, supra note 195, at 12-13.
204. Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).
205. The government urged the court to accept an alternative to average variable cost for
evaluating the case before it. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1116. The court used both average variable
cost (AVC) and average avoidable cost. Id. at 1120. Average avoidable cost had earlier been
proposed as a substitute for AVC by William Baumol. See William J. Baumol, Predation and the
Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J. L. & ECON. 49 (1996).
206. Off. of the Secretary, supra note 195.
207. See Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002).
See also Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and
the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681 (2003).
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Group standards.208
C. The Recent Merger Approvals
As noted earlier, the post-2008 crisis period has seen four major mergers
approved by the DOJ, producing a significant cumulative increase in
concentration.  In a recent merger (American/US Air) the DOJ’s brief listed 460209
city-pair markets which the guidelines would treat as presumptively unlawful on
concentration grounds.  It is important, therefore, to examine the DOJ’s210
approach to these mergers and the rationales that it employed in approving them.
How is it that the DOJ initially sought to enjoin the American/US Air merger but
subsequently approved it?
Given the troubled financial history of the airline industry, this Article first
examines the failing firm doctrine to ascertain whether that doctrine offers any
basis for the merger approvals.  The Article concludes that it does not.  This211 212
Article then examines potential competition.  Would potential competition213
among the legacy carriers prevent the DOJ from approving these mergers? The
Article concludes that the DOJ did not consider the other legacy carriers as
potential competitors and only took into account actual competition between the
merging airlines.  This Article also examines network effects, observing their214
potential to generate consumer benefits.  The Article concludes that the DOJ’s215
approval aimed at the generation of consumer benefit that would result from each
merger’s combination of the parties’ networks.  Underlying and supporting this216
analysis are (1) the minimal anticipated price effects of the mergers, probably due
largely to the competition of the LCCs; and (2) the opportunities provided by two
of the mergers for the DOJ to condition approval upon transfer of legacy-held
gates and slots to LCCs.217
1. The Failing Firm Defense.—Antitrust law does not recognize a “failing
firm” defense to an otherwise unlawful conditional merger unless (in the absence
of the merger) the assets of one of the merging firms would exit the market.218
Under both the merger guidelines and the case law, this requires a showing that
firm in question is unable to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
208. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1118-21.
209. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, infra note 228, at 18 n.9 
210. Complaint at Appendix A, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69
(D.D.C. 2014) (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
211. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
212. See id.
213. See infra notes 221-35 and accompanying text.
214. See id.
215. See infra notes 236-76.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 153-54 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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Act.  In fact, reorganization under Chapter 11 is common in the airline industry219
where such reorganizations have enabled legacy carriers to cancel or modify labor
contracts and thereby to reduce their labor costs.  So Chapter 11 was clearly220
available to the merging airlines and many of the merging parties had recently
used it. The merging firms thus did not meet the preconditions for using the
failing-firm defense.
2. Potential Competition.—One seemingly obvious objection to the merger
of two airlines, even where route overlap is not substantial, turns on potential
competition.  That is, how likely is it that, in the absence of the merger221
undergoing review, one merger partner would choose to enter a city-pair market
to compete with the other merger partner?  In none of the merger evaluations222
did the DOJ consider the potential competition that one of the merger partners
posed for the other, absent the merger.
In 2005, an Antitrust Division official described its merger enforcement
approach to the airline industry as:
Reviewing any particular merger, we first identify the city pairs in which
the merging carriers both provide service. It also may be appropriate to
consider markets in which the two both are likely to provide service in
the future, such that today they are ‘potential’ competitors.223
How the likelihood of entry would be evaluated goes unstated. Nevertheless,
despite the varying strengths of the firms involved in the recent mergers, all were
in some sense national firms with at least some potential to increase their
presence in geographic areas in which they were relatively weak.224
Discussion of mergers between firms that might become direct competitors
has changed across the various versions of the Merger Guidelines. The 1984
Merger Guidelines treated mergers involving potential competitors as non-
horizontal mergers, which were distinguished from vertical and horizontal
mergers.  Under the 1984 Merger Guidelines, mergers involving potential225
competitors were analyzed under headings of harm to “actual potential
competition” and to “perceived potential competition.”  Both involved likely226
entrants but with a different focus: The former involved a merger of a likely
219. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, infra note 227, § 5.1; see also Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969).
220. Eva M. Dowdell, The Chapter 11 “Shuttle”—Coincidence Or Competitive Strategy?, 71
J. AIR L. & COM. 669, 673-74 (2006).   
221. JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW & TRADE REGULATION, Ch. 3, §
30.03[7] (2d ed. 2015). 
222. Id.
223. J. Bruce McDonald, Antitrust for Airlines, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.: JUST. NEWS (Nov. 3,
2005), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-airlines [https://perma.cc/E3YV-9W8L].
224. Id.
225. 1984 Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/
1984-merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/G3PK-AD3F] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017). 
226. Id.
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entrant with an incumbent firm that eliminated the entry and thus eliminated the
de-concentration effect of entry; while the latter eliminated the downward
pressure on price that can be exerted by likely entry and hence limit pricing by
the current market participants. Of course, a merger that deconcentrates a market
necessarily involves at least one company that at the time of the merger is in a
horizontal and competitive relationship to market participants. And a merger
involving a company that exerts downward pressure on market prices necessarily
is similarly in a horizontal and competitive relationship to the market participants.
It would be an apt use of language to describe the firms in these horizontal
relationships as competitors. The 2010 Merger Guidelines treat potential
competition as a horizontal merger problem, thus, employing a broader approach
to horizontal competition than its 1984 and 1992 predecessors.  In its opening227
sentence these guidelines state its reach as extending to “mergers and acquisitions
involving actual or potential competitors.”228
Despite the remarks the DOJ official gave in 2005 quoted above,  the DOJ229
appears to have given little if any attention in its treatment of airline mergers to
possible entry into new city pairs with nonstop service either before or after the
new 2010 Merger Guidelines.  The Delta/Northwest merger preceded the 2010230
Guidelines; the United/Continental merger took place in the year that the new
guidelines were issued; and the American/US Air merger followed three years
later.  Yet there is no indication of the Department directing its attention to231
potential competition issues between and among the merger participants in any
of these mergers.  That is probably because the Department does not consider232
the major airlines as potential competitors. No major airline (except Southwest)
is likely to enter a city pair market already served by one or more of the other
majors. The closest the majors have come to unsettling their oligopolistic
relations was in US Air’s “Advantage Program,” in which US Air offered a
discounted one-stop flight in competition with nonstop flights offered by other
227. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 7, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Aug. 19, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/810276/download [https://perma.cc/Q4AE-SPQP].
228. Id. at 1; see generally M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vencenzo, Evaluating Mergers
Between Potential Competitors Under the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 25 ANTITRUST 33
(2010) (noting, tracing, and discussing the development of the treatment of potential competition
from existing firms). 
229. See McDonald, supra note 223 and accompanying text.
230. Henry Graber, Why Hasn’t the Obama DOJ Blocked More Mergers?, SLATE: MONEY
BOX (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2016/10/11/how_things_went_
down_when_the_doj_moved_to_block_the_american_airlines_merger.html [https://perma.cc/VJ97-
GHFC].
231. See Tal Yellin, The Runway to the Final Four, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.
com/infographic/news/companies/airline-merger/ [https://perma.cc/UT4J-PNWY] (last visited Jan.
20, 2017).   
232. See, e.g., Marilyn Geewax, DOJ Suit Seen Delaying, Not Killing Big Airline Merger,
NPR (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/13/211729307/doj-suit-seen-delaying-not-
killing-big-airline-merger [https://perma.cc/K7R2-VEFP].  
566 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:539
majors.233
A very detailed discussion of the Delta/Northwest merger by Mark Israel,
Bryan Keating, Daniel Rubinfeld, and Robert Willig never considers Delta or
Northwest as potential competitors to each other on routes they were not already
serving (even perhaps to dismiss its probability), while the DOJ’s Competitive
Impact Statement of the American Airlines/US Air merger similarly completely
ignores such competitive concerns while stressing that divested gates and slots
as part of the agreed settlement “would expand the presence of potentially
disruptive competitors at these strategically important airports.”  The original234
complaint filed uses the phrase “actual and potential” competition,  to attack the235
merger, but the “potential” part is never discussed. Rather, the key to the
Department’s approach may lie in the network effects generated by these mergers.
3. Network Effects and Efficiencies.—The first of the recent mergers,
Delta/Northwest, is the best documented.  In that case, the merging parties236
formalized a defense that appears to have been accepted to some extent by the
government in all three.  In evaluating the Delta/Northwest merger, the DOJ237
accepted and used ideas about both the value to passengers of network effects and
the cost saving to the airlines of effectuating them.  For consumers, these effects238
may save trip time, provide a greater density of flights, and allow convenience of
scheduling between points or simply allow the traveler to stay with a preferred
airline. Whatever the reason, network effects raise the benefit of a product or
service to consumers and can be regarded as an increase in quality. Just like any
enhancement of quality, they make the product or service more desirable and
raise the willingness to pay. Quality improvements that immediately benefit
purchasers have always counted positively in merger analysis and are explicitly
233. Conor Shine, More Changes Coming to American Airlines’ AAdvantage Frequent Flier
Program in August, DALL. NEWS (June 6, 2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/airlines/
2016/06/06/more-changes-coming-to-american-airlines-aadvantage-frequent-flier-program-in-
august [https://perma.cc/XF35-KXPB].   
234. CIS at 9, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2014) (No.
1:13-CV-01236), ECF No. 148, https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/514516/download
[https://perma.cc/492D-JC7Y]. 
235. Complaint at 34, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-CV-01236),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/514531/download [https://perma.cc/86CM-UNAG].
236. See, e.g., Mark Israel et al., The Delta-Northwest Merger: Consumer Benefits from
Airline Network, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, & POLICY 576 (John
E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 6th ed. 2014).
237. Id.
238. Id.; see, e.g., Ken Heyer et al., The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division,
2008-2009, 35 REV. INDUS. ORG. 349 (2009); J. Bruce McDonald, Successful Merger of American
Airlines and US Airways Shows Facts, Facts, Facts Critical to Antitrust Review, TEX. LAWBOOK
(June 25, 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/ccb73591-83a2-408f-9624-25d2c1a72
f7d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/12ae56a5-8152-4331-9805-6cb727542716/
Bruce%20McDonald%20AA%20Antitrust%20Article.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VRE-HNHX].
2017] U.S. AIRLINES AND ANTITRUST 567
recognized in successive guidelines.239
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the increase in consumer surplus that may
accompany the merger of two firms in an industry, such as the airline industry,
that generates network effects.  Figure 1 shows two demand configurations and240
two configurations of cost.  Prior to the merger, we assume that the willingness241
0  to pay for a typical trip on either of two (identical) airlines is given by DD , with
0marginal revenue MR  and marginal cost MC.  Hence the price is B and
242
0consumer surplus is DBP .  After the merger, the profit-maximizing price
243
remains the same by construction (because the demand curves are drawn to be
iso-elastic, although more generally the price could go either up or down), but the
1demand curve is now DD  because of the increased value brought about by the
merger through enhancing the quality of the product.  Consumer surplus rises244
0to DCP .  An alternative way of looking at the problem—and one developed by
245
Israel et al.—is that the marginal willingness to pay at the original volume of
traffic is now B’ instead of B.246
Figure 1
239. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 227, at 29. 
240. See infra Figure 1.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See generally Israel et al., supra note 236.
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0Very importantly, even if the observed money price rose slightly above P
because of increased market power on some routes, the gain in consumer surplus
would swamp that loss as the diagram is drawn.  Note that after the merger the247
diagram would capture the activity of one (identical) half of the merged firm.248
In the scenario developed so far, both profits and consumer surplus rise;
hence the Williamson tradeoff  does not apply. All of this analysis so far has249
assumed constant costs by the providers. If there are production cost
savings—and the parties in the Northwest-Delta merger claimed them to be very
large—then the overall welfare gains are even greater. If fixed costs alone (not
shown) are reduced, profits rise without a change in price; if marginal cost falls
to MC , then the observed price of the average trip falls as well.1
These issues were raised explicitly or implicitly by all three large legacy
mergers considered in this paper. An article by Israel, Keating, Rubinfeld, and
Willig, mostly drawn from their research at the behest of the merging firms,
reports that the DOJ based its approval of the Delta/Northwest merger on the
large consumer benefit generated by network effects and only “modest” price
effects.  (The price effects were deemed modest because they affected only a250
few routes where the merged Delta would lack competition from an independent
carrier.)  A published report on DOJ activity written by law enforcers Ken251
Heyer, Carl Shapiro, and Jeffrey Wilder ratifies that interpretation by suggesting
that a very modest anticipated price effect of the merger would be overbalanced
by efficiencies.  Although the Heyer et al. paper did not use the term “network252
effects,” it reported the DOJ did recognize consumer benefit in the merger “by
facilitating schedule improvements, by allowing for a more efficient allocation
of aircraft across the network, and through marketing synergies that could make
the merged carrier’s service more attractive to consumers.”  In other words,253
these authors are expanding the meaning of “efficiencies” from its usual meaning
of cost reduction to a broader meaning that includes consumer benefits resulting
from network effects.
Heyer et al. accepted an analysis based on the airlines’ own assumptions
about the dollar equivalence of various quality enhancements rather than the
much larger consumer gains from the model prepared by Israel et al. for Delta and
Northwest.  They still found consumer benefits vastly in excess of any forecast254
price increases on the routes where the two firms had confronted each other as the
sole legacy carriers.  But greater head-to-head competition between the firms255
247. See Figure 1.
248. Id.
249. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs,
58 THE AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).  
250. Israel et al., supra note 236, at 582.
251. Id. at 581.
252. Heyer et al., supra note 238. 
253. Id.
254. Id. 
255. Id.
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had they remained independent was not even considered—either by the firms or
the agencies.  This could be due to the usual DOJ time horizon of only two256
years,  but it could also suggest a more fundamental recognition of the structural257
unlikelihood that entrenched oligopolists would engage in strong head-to-head
competition in an industry with almost perfectly transparent, instantaneously
available prices and only minor product innovation. It necessarily must also
reflect the barrels of red ink that had marked the industry in most previous years.
It is important to note that consumer valuation in the three merger cases is
based entirely on estimates of willingness to pay without distinction about why
consumers find the merger valuable.  This evaluation thus accepts the258
marketing-generated preferences noted earlier. But this is a convention implicitly
accepted in most modern antitrust analyses. Increased willingness to pay based
on individual preferences rather than on an external evaluation of product
characteristics respects consumer sovereignty.259
The original complaint against American Airlines describes the pricing
policies of the legacy airlines.  The pricing policies involve tentative price260
leadership, price changes withdrawn when not followed, and close to uniform
pricing in short-term equilibrium for various “brands”—each of which has its
own loyal followings but apparently cannot be consistently ordered in overall
quality.  This pattern resembles the decades-long cigarette oligopoly featured261
in myriad economic textbooks.  A major lesson emerged from two landmark262
antitrust cases involving the cigarette industry, thirty-five years apart. The
breakup of the original American Tobacco Co. in 1911  could not have263
prevented the successor companies from adopting monopoly-like pricing when
three of them controlled most of the market. Thus, the case against the successor
companies in 1946  showed them engaged in the kind of parallel pricing that is264
characteristic of tight oligopolies.  As economists and legal scholars have long265
256. Id.
257. Constance K. Robinson, Dir. of Operations, Antitrust Div.: Dep’t of Just., Address at The
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Sept. 30, 1996), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
speech/bank-mergers-and-antitrust-trends [https://perma.cc/D85E-SBH9].
258. See, e.g., Oliver Richard, Flight Frequency and Mergers in Airline Markets, 21 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 907 (2003) (discussing how studies tend to focus only on price instead of other
consumer choices like flight frequency).
259. See generally Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713 (1997).
260. Complaint at 15-18, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C.
2014) (No. 1:13-CV-01236).
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 358, 656 (4th ed. 2005).
263. See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
264. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). 
265. Id. at 807-08. Another parallel with the airlines is that the major tobacco firms were also
found guilty of predatory pricing against entrants pursuing a low-price strategy. CARLTON &
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recognized, there are no feasible policies to combat “parallel pricing” and to
impose price competition.266
The Delta/Northwest merger differed from the two that followed because the
approval did not require the firms to give up any gates or slots. Approval rested
on an increase in consumer valuation of likely changes by the two merging
parties on the apparent assumption that they were not imminently likely to engage
in more competitive behavior towards each other. The settlement did not
necessitate any quid pro quo to increase competition in the market. In contrast,
both of the other approved mergers involved the enhancement of access by LCCs
to “constrained airports.”  267
Although the United/Continental merger of 2010 was not challenged, and
therefore no Competitive Impact Statement was required by the Tunney Act,268
the DOJ discussed its United/Continental action in the Statement explaining its
ultimate approval of the American Airlines/US Air merger.  The explanation269
bears quoting at length:
Past antitrust enforcement demonstrates that providing LCCs with access
to constrained airports results in dramatic consumer benefits. In 2010, in
response to the United States’ concerns regarding competitive effects of
the proposed United/Continental merger, United and Continental
transferred 36 slots, three gates and other facilities at Newark to
Southwest. Southwest used those assets to establish service on six
nonstop routes from Newark, resulting in substantially lower fares to
consumers. For example, average fares for travel between Newark and
St. Louis dropped 27% and fares for travel between Newark and Houston
dropped 15%. In addition, Southwest established connecting service to
approximately 60 additional cities throughout the United States. 
The proposed remedy will require the divestiture of almost four times as
many slots as were divested at the time of the United/Continental merger,
plus gates and additional facilities at key airports throughout the country.
In total, the divestitures will significantly strengthen the purchasing
carriers, provide the incentive and ability for those carriers to invest in
new capacity, and position them to provide more meaningful competition
PERLOFF, supra note 262, at 358.
266. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 661-63 (1962); see also WILLIAM H.
NICHOLS, PRICE POLICIES IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY 401 (1951).
267. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 238, at 2-3.
268. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012), popularly known as
the Tunney Act, requires a court review of DOJ actions on challenged mergers and acquisitions as
well as a competitive impact statement prepared by the agency.
269. CIS at 10, United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (D.D.C. 2014) (No.
1:13-CV-01236), ECF No. 148, https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/514516/download
[https://perma.cc/492D-JC7Y].
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system-wide.270
The original complaint against the American/US Air merger devoted much space
to the competition provided to the other legacy carriers by US Air, which DOJ
argued engaged in more price competition than other legacy carriers (through its
“Advantage Fares” on connecting flights) because its hubs were less
advantageously placed.  But DOJ may have decided that it could achieve both271
higher quality service and the possibility of increased price competition by
approving the merger. A similar calculation may have underlain the approval of
United/Continental: In each case the loss of possibly largely ineffective
competition was sacrificed for the more promising price-reduction policy of
encouraging the LCCs along with some increased product quality and cost saving.
D. An Interpretation: How DOJ’s Merger Evaluations in the Airline
Industry Differ from Its Normal Merger Evaluations
Prices are the focus of routine merger evaluation.  The analysis begins with272
the Department’s assessment of the relevant market, using a hypothetical
monopolist framework set forth in the guidelines.  The idea is to equate the273
relevant market for merger evaluation with the geographic and product space in
which a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a small but significant
and non-transitory increase in price.  Post-merger entry is cognizable only if it274
is sufficient to restore price to pre-merger levels within a limited period.  In275
airline mergers this exclusive focus on price and price effects has been replaced
by a broader and more encompassing inquiry.
Several factors explain this broader analytical approach. First, the price
effects of the recent airline mergers, based on an extensive body of econometric
research, were expected to be small. These minimal price effects may be partially
explained by competition from the LCCs. It may also be due to the fact that the
airlines have already maximized their pricing power as Brueckner has
suggested.  These two possible explanations are not inconsistent and both may276
play a role.
Note that a city-pair market composed of three carriers would minimally have
an HHI of over 3000 and would be defined by the merger guidelines as a highly
concentrated market.  Any merger that would raise the HHI in a highly277
concentrated market by more than 200 points would be deemed presumptively
unlawful.  According to the Brueckner studies, the price effects of two-to-one278
270. Id.
271. Complaint at 4-5, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-CV-01236).
272. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 227, § 1.
273. Id. § 4.1.1.
274. Id.
275. Id. § 9.3.
276. See generally BRUECKNER, supra note 110.
277. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 227, § 5.3.
278. Id.
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mergers in city-pair markets are significant but low, about the same (or less) than
a SSNIP.  This was subsequently interpreted by Borenstein to mean that the279
recognition of mutual dependence comes at a lower threshold.  Such reasoning280
could explain the DOJ’s apparent exemption of the airline industry from the
normal presumption of illegality that the guidelines attach to high concentration.
Although the guidelines state that the SSNIP “is not a tolerance level for price
increases resulting from a merger,”  the DOJ has apparently tolerated some281
price increases in that amount because the likely price increases (in the recent
mergers under review) were more than offset by quality-related consumer
benefits.
This brings us to network effects as the source of consumer benefits. As
pointed out above, the hub-and-spoke organization of the large airlines was a
largely unanticipated cost-saving device having demand-side as well as supply-
side ramifications.  This organizational economy benefited consumers by282
lowering their costs of traveling between many cities.  Mergers between283
airlines, whose networks are in substantial part non-overlapping, add to consumer
convenience by enabling consumers to use a larger (merger-enhanced) network
without changing airlines.  In routine merger analysis, the merger partners do284
not normally generate network effects, so there is no corresponding consumer
benefit to evaluate. This, then, makes the evaluation of airline mergers again
different from normal merger evaluation. In airline mergers, the antitrust analysis
cannot focus exclusively on price effects, but must also take account of these
quality enhancements when they are present, because they are part of standard
consumer welfare analysis.  It appears that the DOJ did just that, and concluded285
that the price effects of each of these mergers were offset by the quality effects
generated by combining networks.
In addition, in two of the recent mergers (United/Continental and
American/US Air), the DOJ conditioned approval upon the merger partners
transferring significant numbers of gates or landing slots to Southwest, JetBlue,
or other LCCs.  This could be viewed as a frontal attack on a series of antitrust286
bottlenecks. Because gates and slots are necessary for the LCC to compete and
they are in short supply at a number of major airports, their transfer to LLCs
creates the conditions in which LLC competition at these airports can be
279. The agencies enforcing the guidelines most often use a SSNIP of 5% of the consumer
price. See id. § 4.1.2.
280. Borenstein, supra note 42, at 10.
281. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 227, § 4.1.1.
282. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 33, at 41.
283. Id.
284. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 227, § 3.5.
285. The merger guidelines recognize the theoretical relevance of the non-price effects of
mergers. Id. § 4.1.2 (stating the enforcement agencies methodology is concentrated on price effects
because those effects are quantifiable “not because price effects are more important than non-price
effects”).
286. Id.
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significantly strengthened.287
The required gate and slot transfers bear an analytical similarity to the now
disfavored essential facilities doctrine.  That doctrine (in most of its variations)288
requires an owner of a facility needed to compete to share with rivals when it is
impossible or impractical for them to duplicate it. Where gates and slots are in
short supply in a number of airports, they take on a role analytically similar to the
role played by the terminal facilities. They are limited in number and the merger
participants in both mergers controlled critical numbers of gates and slots,
reinforcing their market power and impeding competition from LCCs.  The289
airport situation, however, takes a somewhat different form. In the airport cases,
there is a public regulator (the DOT and the local airport authorities) of a fixed
or nearly fixed essential facility that is used to capacity. Of these public
regulators, only the DOT is able to regulate gate and slot allocations beyond the
confines of a single airport.  Although the DOJ has succeeded the DOT as290
merger enforcer, the DOT retains at least some authority over competition issues
under section 411. Competition would be furthered if the DOT allotted the gates
and slots in the public interest. So stated, this problem resembles Trinko,  where291
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, determined that the problem—access by
rivals to elements of the telephone network controlled by Verizon—was a
regulatory one within the cognizance of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and not within the domain of antitrust.  Verizon could be292
read as indicating the allocation of gates and slots is a matter for the DOT. In the
merger cases under review, the DOJ has used its jurisdiction over mergers to
preempt any attempt by the DOT to address the allocation of gates and slots.293
In context, this aggressive use of antitrust by the DOJ appears fully justified: The
DOJ is well within its authority to take competitive conditions into account in
settlements; and its actions are likely to further the congressional purpose of
enhanced antitrust enforcement underlying the transfer of enforcement authority
over mergers from the DOT to the DOJ.
As a condition for approving the United/Continental merger, the DOJ
287. Id.
288. That doctrine, as exemplified by the St. Louis Terminal RR case involved a group of
railroads controlling access to terminal facilities needed by all railroads to compete in cross-country
traffic. United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383, 390-93 (1912). The Court ruling
provided access to those facilities by all of the competing railroads. Id. at 411-13. In his majority
opinion in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410-11
(2004), Justice Scalia denied that the Court had ever recognized an essential facilities doctrine.
Although the Court did not employ the term, most antitrust observers believe that the doctrine
originated in Terminal Railroad.
289. Id. at 79-80.
290. 49 U.S.C. § 41714 (2012).
291. 540 U.S. at 411-16.
292. Id. at 410-11.
293. See generally id.; see also United States v. US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69
(D.D.C. 2014).
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required that the parties transfer thirty-six slots and three gates at Newark to
Southwest.  In the American/US Air merger, the DOJ required the parties to294
divest 104 slots at Washington’s Reagan National and thirty-four slots at New
York’s LaGuardia airports.  Sixteen of the affected slots at Reagan were already295
leased by JetBlue from American, but the final judgment makes these slots
permanently available to JetBlue.  The remaining eighty-eight slots at Reagan296
will be divested to at least two carriers approved by the DOJ.  The merger297
approval conditions require the divestiture of thirty-four slots at LaGuardia.298
Ten of these slots were already leased to Southwest, but the final judgment
awards them permanently to Southwest.  The remaining twenty-four slots will299
be awarded to carriers approved by the DOJ.  The merger approval conditions300
also require the divestiture to airlines approved by the DOJ of two gates at each
of the following cities: Chicago (O’Hare), Los Angeles, Boston, Miami, and
Dallas.301
Slot and gate divestitures aim to stimulate competition in the context of the
particular structure of the U.S. airline industry. The DOJ’s strategy is apparently
based on a recognition that price competition is unlikely among the legacy
carriers whose marketing practices are interdependent. Instead, its strategy relies
on the LCCs to generate price competition. So far, the LCCs have operated with
different incentives and business plans than have the legacies, and the LCCs
pricing policies have diverged significantly from the legacy carriers, generating
a strong downwards pressure on prices.302
In approving the American/US Air merger, the DOJ countenanced the
elimination of the US Air’s Advantage Fare program, a program under which US
Air undercut legacy nonstop fares on US Air flights requiring a stop.  This was303
a major objection to the merger in the original complaint,  but the concern was304
ultimately shelved. Why? The DOJ may well have thought that the Advantage
Fare program contributed less to price competition than would the new LCC
competition that would emerge because of the slot and gate transfers that were
part of the settlement.
In summary, the LCCs played a critical role in the approval of the last two
294. CIS at 10, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
295. Final Judgment at 3-4, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236);
CIS at 8 US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
296. Final Judgment at 7, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236); CIS
at 10-11, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
297. Final Judgment at 3-4, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
298. Id. at 8.
299. Id. at 2, 8.
300. Id. at 4, 8.
301. Id. at 4, 9.
302. See generally VASIGH, supra note 53, at ch. 12.
303. See United States v. US Airways Grp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 77 (D.D.C. 2014) (describing
US Airways “Advantage Fares” program).
304. Complaint at ¶¶ 5-7, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
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mergers considered. Previous research provided grounds for expecting only a
minimal price effect from the mergers, partly due to existing LCC competition.305
In addition, the mandated gate and slot transfers were keyed to opening markets
to substantially increase that competition.  Actual and anticipated price306
competition from the LCCs allowed the estimated value of enhanced quality from
the mergers to outweigh estimated price effects.307
E. Apparent Merger Results So Far
Since the mergers, the airline industry has recovered from the effects of the
recession, and the industry is earning record profits.  This profitability extends308
to all three of the merged legacy carriers.  This resurgent demand has at least309
temporarily solved the financial problems that have plagued the industry in the
past. Is there evidence that the DOJ’s use of network-generated consumer surplus
as a tool of merger evaluation generates sound policy? 
Any indication of increased demand from network effects alone based on
market share changes would be highly tentative, given that the data are
completely uncontrolled, especially for prices and the fact that airline network
changes were overlapping and management changes from mergers often create
temporary difficulties. Nevertheless, the Delta/Northwest merger may have
generated some effects that are indicative of the quality enhancement. Although
both firms stumbled in the year prior to the merger, the combination resulted in
an immediate, sustained, and considerable expansion of share, in conformity with
the model in Figure 1.  310
Table 1
Delta and Northwest Market Shares
(Enplanements in thousands. Market shares computed from enplanements.)
305. See US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d at 77-79.
306. CIS at 8-10, US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69 (No. 1:13-cv-01236).
307. See US Airways Grp., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d at 77-79.
308. Mouawad, supra note 69.
309. Id.
310. See supra Figure 1.
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The United/Continental merger, however, seems to tell a different story. In
2010 when the two airlines announced their intention to merge until 2015, the
combined market share declined each year, although the rate of decline had been
slowing.  The decline was reversed in 2015, however, and the merged airline’s311
market share increased by almost two percent.   312
Table 2
United and Continental Market Shares
(Enplanements in thousands. Market shares computed from enplanements.)
The attraction of a combined network cannot be discerned in the
American/US Air merger shown in Table 3.  The merger did not take place until313
the settlement with the DOJ in late 2013.  In 2013, the year in which the merger314
was being litigated, the combined carriage of the constituent airlines increased by
2.3% and market share by 1.8%, but in 2014, the first year of operation of the
merged airline, its growth declined to 1.7% and market share dropped by nearly
one percent.  The last full year for which data is available, 2015, was a boom315
year for the industry as a whole, but the merged airline saw an enplanement
increase of less than one percent and a nearly four percent loss of market share.316
311. See infra Table 2.
312. See infra Table 2.
313. See supra Table 3.
314. United States v. US Airways Grp., 38 F. Supp. 3d 69, 72 (D.D.C. 2014).
315. See infra Table 3.
316. See infra Table 3.
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Table 3
American and US Air Market Shares
(Enplanements in thousands. Market shares computed from enplanements.)
Perhaps the United/Continental merger will yet expand its output beyond pre-
merger levels. Perhaps the American/US Air merger will attain robust growth. At
the present time, however, only the Delta/Northwest merger appears to be
generating the increased demand that network effects seemed to promise. The
clearest conclusion from the data so far is that any such effects appear to be easily
lost among other factors determining the demand for a specific airline.
CONCLUSION
The airline industry’s unique characteristics support a merger analysis that
differs in critical ways from traditional merger analysis. Indeed, because other
industries such as the communications and software industries also generate
network effects, it is possible that antitrust merger analysis will be affected in
these industries as well.  The DOJ clearly accepted the argument that a merger317
between largely non-overlapping airline networks can generate significant
consumer surplus without offsetting price effects. The first of the three major
recent mergers may confirm the soundness of that conclusion, but the jury is
clearly still out on the other two.  One possibility is that network benefits have318
been exaggerated, and the reduced number of players nationally may allow for
a greater exercise of collective market power. Or the very dramatic recent
increase in airline profitability may yet disappear as the major players probe new
dimensions of competition to increase firm profitability. In any event, the
presence of the LCCs is providing competition for the legacy carriers, thus
dampening the effects of the legacies’ increased recognition of mutual
dependence. This is greatly facilitated by far more easily available information
on prices by the travelling public brought by the digital age. The DOJ’s
recognition of the consumer welfare impact of the LCCs has focused the DOJ on
gate and slot transfers to increase LCC competitive impact.
317. See supra Part I.E.
318. See supra Part II.E.
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Forecasting the future of the airline industry has been hazardous in the past,
and certainly remains so. Southwest, the largest of the LCCs, is now the largest
originator of domestic air traffic,  and, although it has been widely recognized319
as generating significant downward pressure on the prices of the legacy carriers
that compete with it, both its costs and its prices appear to have been rising
relative to the legacy carriers.  But JetBlue, another of the LCCs, has grown to320
be the fifth largest carrier,  and it also produces strong downward pricing321
pressure on the legacy carriers that compete with it. More generally, if, as appears
likely, the major carriers will engage in only muted competition against each
other in the future, market performance will turn largely on the discipline
provided by the LCCs and their support by legal authority.
319. Departures Performed by Unique Carrier for 2016, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., http://www.
transtats. bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/WCE5-24ZC] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
320. Bachman, supra note 161.
321. On-Flight Market Passengers Enplaned by UniqueCarrier for 2015, BUREAU TRANSP.
STAT., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/E4RV-7V83] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
